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The experience of Australia provides important lessons in considering the Lords reform in the UK. In the first
of a two article series, Robin Archer  maintains that an elected upper house may obstruct the House of
Commons and cannot be relied upon to act in accordance with conventions that limit its power vis-à-vis the
lower chamber.  
Proponents of  the government’s Lords ref orm f ace a cruel dilemma. It seems obvious that directly
electing the members of  the upper house of  parliament would make Britain more democratic. Yet such a
move could pose a serious threat to the principle of  responsible government – the principle that any
government can hold of f ice if  and only if  it  has the conf idence of  a majority in the popularly accountable
lower house – a principle that lies at the f oundation of  parliamentary democracy in the Westminster
system.
How might a directly elected upper house – especially one elected by proportional representation –
af f ect Westminster-style democracy? The obvious place to look is to Britain’s closest relatives in the
Westminster stable: Canada, New Zealand and Australia. However, Canada has maintained a wholly
appointed Senate, and New Zealand has abolished its upper house. Australia, on the other hand, has
over a hundred years experience with an elected Senate.
When delegates f rom the dif f erent Australian self -
governing colonies met in a series of  conventions in
the 1890s to draf t a constitution f or the
Commonwealth of  Australia, questions about the
powers and composition of  the upper house produced
the most lengthy and dif f icult debates. The delegates
all had long f amiliarity with the Westminster system of
responsible government in their own colony. And all
assumed that the new f ederal government would also
be based on this principle. However, while the smaller
states demanded the establishment of  a ‘states’
house’ on the model of  the United States Senate as
the price f or union, the larger states worried about the
consequences of  this f or responsible government.
The outcome was a hybrid with a lower house – the House of  Representatives – modeled on the UK
House of  Commons, and an upper house – the Senate – modeled on the US Senate. The Senate was to
be directly elected with 6 (now 12) senators f or each state. The normal term of  each senator was twice
the maximum three year term f or the House of  Representatives, with half  the Senate seats up f or
election each time the lower house went to the polls.
The Senate has near-equal powers to the House of  Representatives. In a concession to the concerns
about responsible government, the majority of  delegates agreed to a deadlock breaking procedure in
which, if  the Senate twice rejected a bill, the government could call f or a double dissolution in which all
seats in both houses would be up f or election. But this has proved cumbersome and largely inef f ective.
The convention delegates also agreed that the Senate could not “init iate” or “amend” money bills, but it
retained the power to “suggest” changes. The delegates were right to worry about these issues. Conf lict
between the houses has proved to be a major and ongoing f eature of  Australia polit ics.
The Australian experience of  this system suggests three important lessons. The f irst concerns the basic
rationale f or having an upper house. In Australia, as in many modern bicameral systems, the basic
rationale was a f ederal one. However this almost immediately proved to be illusory. All agreed that the
establishment of  the Senate was designed to protect states’ rights. But that role was nullif ied by the
presence of  disciplined parties, and the Senate never did operate as a states’ house. Instead it has
largely acted at the behest of  party leaders, who, in the case of  the major parties, invariably sit in the
lower house. The development of  devolution makes it dif f icult to argue that the UK can still be seen as a
unitary state. But the Australian experience suggests that any attempt to ref orm the upper house to act
as a genuinely f ederal body is likely to be f utile.
The second lesson concerns ef f ects that stem f rom the choice of  electoral system. Until 1918, both the
House of  Representatives and the Senate were elected using the First Past The Post system. Until
1948, both were elected using the Alternative Vote (AV). But f rom then on, while the House of
Representatives continued to be elected using AV, the Senate was elected using a f orm of  proportional
representation (PR), namely the Single Transf erable Vote. Prior to this last change, the majority in the
lower house could usually rely on also winning a majority in the upper house. But af ter the introduction of
PR, this has usually not been the case.
Indeed, governments have only had a Senate majority in 6 of  the last 30 years. Soon af ter the
introduction of  PR, the share of  minor party votes in Senate elections doubled f rom 5 to over 10
percent, and the trend has been f or it to continue to rise. In the last twenty years it has almost always
been between 20 and 25 percent. It is now widely considered unlikely that any government can win a
Senate majority. The conservative Howard government did unexpectedly achieve this in 2005. However
minor parties soon regained the balance of  power. Australian experience suggests that the introduction
of  PR to elect a ref ormed House of  Lords would virtually guarantee the lack of  a government majority in
the upper house, and would regularly produce conf licting majorit ies in the two houses of  parliament.
The third lesson concerns the ef f ect of  relying on conventions to limit the power of  an elected upper
house. The most dramatic example of  this can be seen in the 1975 constitutional crisis, which brought
down the Whitlam Labor government, despite the f act that it had just been reelected the previous year
and still demonstrably commanded a majority in the House of  Representatives. When the (conservative)
Liberals and their allies, led by opposition leader Malcolm Fraser, acquired a majority in the Senate, they
used their numbers to block the government’s budget. In the stand of f  that f ollowed, the Governor-
General – acting with what he said were his ‘reserve powers’ as the Queen’s Representative  – dismissed
the government – acting contrary to the advice of  Prime Minister Whitlam and an express resolution of
the House of  Representatives – and called early elections, which, amidst great turmoil, the Fraser- led
Liberals went on to win.
The constitution drawn up by the conventions of  the 1890s f ocused much attention on the f ederal
aspects of  the new Commonwealth. But true to their Brit ish inheritance, the delegates f elt lit t le need to
codif y the basic principles of  responsible government with which they were all f amiliar. Fundamental
issues like these were lef t to tradit ion and convention. The dangers of  this were now readily apparent.
Where they obstructed the party polit ical interests of  key actors, basic conventions that underwrote
responsible government were ignored or overridden. Of  particular importance were the conventions that
the upper house should not block money bills and that the Queen’s representative should act on the
advice of  the leader of  the majority in the lower house.
More recently, f rustration with Senate obstruction has become as much a concern of  the right as the lef t.
A number of  major legislative objectives of  the Howard government (in of f ice f rom 1996 to 2007) were
blocked. And even when an amended version of  government legislation was ult imately passed, the
Senate was f requently able to exert substantial inf luence over the outcome. Howard himself  appealed to
a Commons-style convention that explicit commitments during an election had given him a mandate to
pursue certain legislative goals, but the elected Senate was not disposed to accept the self - restraint of
the Lords.
The current relatively weak ability of  the House of  Lords to obstruct a majority in the Commons is a
product of  a series of  ad hoc concessions which exist only in the f orm of  conventions or ordinary acts
of  parliament and which are ult imately underwritten by the Lords’ lack of  legit imacy. Australian experience
suggests that an elected upper house cannot be relied upon to act in accordance with such conventions.
Restrictions lef t in this f orm – even those that appear at present to be beyond dispute – can and will be
over-ridden.
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